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Abstract
Although the U.S. Supreme Court reached the correct result in Obergefell v. Hodges, its
substantive due process and equal protection analyses were wrong. First, the majority opinion
discusses the concept of equal dignity, which has no legal definition nor has it been used in prior
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The majority made another mistake in using substantive due
process when Obergefell could have been decided on the basis of equal protection alone.
Despite these mistakes, there were parts of the opinion the Court did decide correctly.
The end result -- that same-sex couples have the right to marry -- was the correct outcome. This
is based on the fact that the Supreme Court has defined marriage as a fundamental right and
banning marriage to same sex couples would be discrimination on the part of the government.
While the majority was also correct in overruling the prior method of defining fundamental
rights set forth by Glucksberg, the Court should not have made defining fundamental rights so
unlimited in scope. Justice Kennedy removed the prior standard for defining fundamental rights
without creating a new standard for judges to follow in the future, leaving the future of
substantive due process cases uncertain. This neglect to implement a new standard to replace
Glucksberg’s standard leaves substantive due process open to judicial interpretation. The Court
also came close, but still neglected, to create a quasi-suspect class on the basis of sexual
orientation. The Court should have created standards that were not so overly broad for future
decisions regarding substantive due process, and it should have classified sexual orientation as a
quasi-suspect class
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Introduction
The legal battle for marriage equality , the right of same sex couples to marry, has been
fought over several decades. The first case to reach a state supreme court was when a same sex
couple applied for a marriage license in Minnesota in 1970.1 Minnesota denied the couple a
marriage license, and this set off a series of chain reactions of state legislatures banning same sex
marriage starting with Maryland in 1973,2 and even federal legislation prohibiting same sex
marriage.3
President Clinton signed the federal Defense of Marriage Act, commonly known as
DOMA, into law in 1996.4 DOMA defined marriage as a legal union between a man and a
woman, and denied same sex couples benefits that were afforded to opposite sex couples.5
Despite DOMA being federal law, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex
marriage in 2003.6 This was notable, as it was the first state to openly defy DOMA. Other states
began to follow suit.7 It was not until 2013 that the Supreme Court declared DOMA’s definition
of marriage deprived same sex couples of their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection.8

1

Susan Boland, A timeline of the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the U.S., Georgetown Law Library (Jan. 14,
2020), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4182201.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Kimberly Kelley, Defense of Marriage Act, Encyclopedia Britannica (March 1, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Defense-of-Marriage-Act
6
Susan Boland, A timeline of the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the U.S., Georgetown Law Library (Jan. 14,
2020), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4182201.
7
Id.
8
Gautam Raghavan, Obama Administration Statements on the Supreme Court’s DOMA Ruling, the White House
President Barack Obama (June 27, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/27/obamaadministration-statements-supreme-court-s-doma-ruling
The Fifth Amendment contains the prohibition against denying to any persons the life, liberty, and property without
due process of law.
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Following these legislative battles and victories for marriage equality, Obergefell v.
Hodges was filed with the federal district court for the Southern district of Ohio. Other cases
with similar grounds also filed cases in other districts. The circuit courts were split on these
cases, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute, consolidating the cases
into the singular case Obergefell v. Hodges.
Obergefell v. Hodges is the landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that state bans on same sex marriage are unconstitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion, which used a combination of substantive due process and equal
protection concepts to expand the fundamental right to marry to same sex couples. That
fundamental right was established in Meyer v. Nebraska.
Substantive due process, derived from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, is a concept that allows courts to identify and
protect fundamental rights from government interference that are not explicitly identified in the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has used substantive due process to protect the right to
privacy,9 marriage,10 and interstate travel11 among others.
Equal protection arises from the Fourteenth Amendment which says, “No State shall…
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”12 The Equal
Protection Clause protects people within United States from discrimination by the government.
This clause has been used to protect against racial discrimination13 and sex discrimination14.

9

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 153 (1973).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
11
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
12
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
13
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 495 (1954).
14
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 77 (1971).
10
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The Court came to the correct conclusion in allowing same sex couples the right to
marry. However, the majority made mistakes in the opinion that will have lasting consequences
on the courts until the Supreme Court remedies the problem it created. The Court used
substantive due process, rather than equal protection alone to decide Obergefell and it also
created new standards for substantive due process that are far too broad.
Despite these mistakes, the dissenters are incorrect in their own analysis of Obergefell
and do not provide adequate reasoning to exclude same sex couples from the right to marry.
Justice Roberts and Scalia argue that the decision on same sex marriage should have been left to
the people while Justice Thomas argues substantive due process should not be used at all. These
arguments are poorly made and do not invalidate the decision made by the majority. Obergefell
did provide the right to marry for same sex couples was protected under the Constitution, but it
did not go far enough to protect same sex couples.

3

What Obergefell Got Right
Despite the majority opinion’s mistakes, sections of the majority opinion were correct.
The majority held that, “the definition [of the fundamental right of marriage] must include samesex couples because their exclusion irrationally restricts those person’s liberty and irrationally
discriminates against that class of persons.”15 The majority correctly found that same sex couples
have the right to marry.
Even before Obergefell, numerous Supreme Court cases recognized that marriage is a
fundamental right. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held, “the right ‘to marry, establish
a home, and bring up children’ is a central part of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”16
In the years following this decision, numerous cases have referred to the right to marry as a
fundamental right. The Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson said marriage is “one of
the basic civil rights of man.”17 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur the Court declared
that, “this Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”18 The Court in Turner v Safley proposed that, “[T]he decision to marry is a
fundamental right.”19
None of these cases, or any of the cases regarding marriage as a fundamental right, held
that marriage is a right reserved only for opposite sex couples. This likely is a product of the
times, and the Court not necessarily realizing the full impact of one of its decisions. For example,

15

Matthew R. Grothouse, Article: Implicit In the Concept of Ordered Liberty: How Obergefell v. Hodges
Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due Process Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023 (Summer 2016).
16
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 639-40 (1974).
19
Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 95 (1978).
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the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson ruled that state segregation did not violate the equal protection
clause.20 This case upheld the doctrine of separate but equal. It was not until 1954 that the Court
overruled Plessy v. Ferguson in Brown v. Board of Education.21 The Court in Brown
acknowledged that separate but equal was truly not equal, and held that state segregation was not
constitutional. The Court is capable of changing its decisions when it sees a group has been
wronged by the law. Similarly, in Bowers v. Hardwick the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia law criminalizing homosexual sodomy22. The Court overruled this decision almost two
decades later in Lawrence v. Texas.23 Before Obergefell the Court never held that marriage was
strictly a union of a man and a woman, as DOMA would attempt to define marriage.
President Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) into law in 1996.
Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage as between a man and a woman. In 2013, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Windsor found that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment.24 When
discrimination by the government is challenged in the Supreme Court, the Court must examine
the government’s actions under a test of constitutional scrutiny. There are three levels of
constitutional scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict
scrutiny was established in Skinner v. Oklahoma25 and is used on the basis of race. Intermediate
scrutiny was established in Craig v. Boren26 and is used in cases of sex discrimination. Rational
basis review is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. It was established in Nebbia v. New

20

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23
Lawrence v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
24
United States v. Windsor 570 U.S. 775 (2013).
25
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
26
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 197 (1976).
21
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York27. Rational basis review tests whether the government’s actions are rationally related to a
legitimate government interest28. The Court’s reasoning in Windsor was that no legitimate
government purpose overcame the purpose and effect of DOMA, which was to disparage and
injure those living in marriages “less respected than others.”29
Regarding Obergefell, the Supreme Court was correct to hold that marriage as a
fundamental right that includes same-sex couples. There was no precedent to hold that marriage
was exclusively for opposite sex couples, and indeed the Supreme Court struck down such a
definition from the federal government two years before deciding Obergefell. Had the Court
supported a definition of marriage as between a man and a woman, that would have supported
legal discrimination on the part of the states who passed bans on same sex marriage in a manner
similar to how the Court upheld racial discrimination in Plessy v. Ferguson. There would have
been no legitimate purpose for such discrimination by the Court, just as there was none for the
federal government in DOMA. Such discrimination would not pass a rational basis review, as
there is no legitimate government interest that would be served by the government discriminating
against same sex couples and denying them the right to marry.
Although Obergefell should have been decided on equal protection alone, as will be
explained further in the next section, the manner in which the Court used substantive due process
to determine that same sex couples have the right to marry was apt. The majority, “focused not
on inventing a new right, but on whether the exclusion of a certain class of individuals from the
definition of a fundamental right was constitutionally permissible.”30

27

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
United States v. Caroline Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
29
Id.
30
Matthew R. Grothouse, Article: Implicit In the Concept of Ordered Liberty: How Obergefell v. Hodges
Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due Process Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1063 (Summer 2016).
28
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Justice Kennedy cites four principles and traditions that demonstrate why marriage is a
fundamental right. He articulates these principles and applies them to same sex couples to show
that same sex couples should be included in the fundamental right to marry. The first principal is
that, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.”31 Kennedy references this principle as the reason Loving v. Virginia invalidated
interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause.32 Kennedy uses this principle as basis to
determine that people have the right to choose to get married and to decide who they marry. In
Loving this principle defended the right of individuals to choose to marry a person of a different
race. The principle is used here to defend the right of individuals to choose who they marry.
The second principle Kennedy references is that, “the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to committed
individuals.”33 This principle was used in Griswold v. Connecticut, which held that married
couples had the right to use contraception.34 Griswold said that marriage is a right, “older than
the Bill of Rights.”35 This principle recognizes that marriage, although not expressly enumerated
in the Constitution, is a right the Court has continually recognized throughout its jurisprudence
because its origin is indeed older than the Constitution, and its importance demands the
Constitution protect it.
The third principle Kennedy draws upon is that marriage, “safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and

31

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2599 (2015).
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 486 (1965).
32
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education.”36 Kennedy uses Zablock v. Redhaili to support this principle, which says, “[T]he
right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.”37 Kennedy argues that, “excluding same-sex couples from marriage
conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry”38 because same sex couples can provide,
“loving and nurturing homes to their children”39 and because, “most states have allowed gays
and lesbians to adopt… and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents…this
provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving,
supportive families.”40 Kennedy argues that by not allowing same sex marriages, children of
same sex couples suffer a stigma because their families are seen as lesser than families with
opposite sex parents.41 This would contradict the protection of marriage’s safeguarding children
and families.
The final principle Kennedy enumerates is that, “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”42 Kennedy argues that
because even states view marriage as part of the social order, the state supports married couples
with benefits regarding taxation, inheritance, and property rights, hospital access, and health
insurance among others.43 Kennedy says that because the state, “makes marriage all the more
precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching
that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects.”44 Because the state grants benefits to

36

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2600 (2015).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 384 (1978).
38
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2600 (2015).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id at 2601.
43
Id.
44
Id.
37
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couples who are married, same sex couples being excluded from these benefits constitutes unjust
discrimination by the government and could not be allowed under the Constitution.
Kennedy uses these four principles to argue, under Substantive Due Process, that “laws
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind
prohibited”45 by the Constitution. These principles relate to standards set by Washington v.
Glucksberg regarding substantive due process. These two standards necessitated that
fundamental rights are, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”46 and a, “careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”47. The four principles relate to the fact
that marriage is deeply rooted in the nation’s history, and the right to marry is already an
established right.
Kennedy establishes that the facts of Obergefell v. Hodges satisfy the standards of
Glucksberg, then proceeds to overrule the Glucksberg standards. Kennedy begins by reiterating
that, “identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty
to interpret the Constitution”48. He does this in order to rebut Scalia’s dissent, in which Scalia
state that the people should have been the decision makers regarding same sex marriage. He then
cites Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman in which Harlan states that the protection of
fundamental rights, “has not been reduced to any formula.”49 The method in Glucksberg
attempted to reduce the identification of fundamental rights down to narrow instructions, and
Kennedy rejects Glucksberg’s two prong test.

45

Id. at 2603.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 721 (1997)
47
Id.
48
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2598 (2015).
49
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, dissenting).
46
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He first rejects the history and tradition section of Glucksberg by arguing, “rights come
not from ancient sources alone… They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”50 This shift in
viewpoint is important to the development of constitutional law as it can allow the Court to
overrule its own prior decisions when those decisions are better understood as wrong as years go
by such as in Brown v. Board of Education. This viewpoint also allows for the protection of
fundamental rights that may previously not have been recognized by the Court. Kennedy
describes prior discrimination against same-sex couples. He includes the instance of
discrimination by the American Psychiatric Association that once considered homosexuality a
mental disorder and treated homosexuality as an illness.51 He then goes on to say that the
American Psychological Association changed this opinion, and after 1973 homosexuality was no
longer considered a mental disorder or illness.52 These points show the change that occurred in
the nation’s reported opinion of homosexuality that, had the Court only used the nation’s
traditions to determine whether same-sex couples had the right to marry, the Court would have
arrived at the incorrect result. Kennedy’s argument shows that, “the fact that this discrimination
against same-sex couples inflicts significant psychological harm justifies ignoring our nation’s
history of LGBT discrimination in the context of marriage, treating it as a part of our history that
deserves to be discarded.”53 Kennedy indeed discards these earlier opinions of homosexuality
and instead rules state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, despite the nation’s long
history of prejudice against them.

50

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2602 (2015).
Id at 2596.
52
Id.
53
Thomas A. Bird, Note: Challenging the Levels of Generality Problem: How Obergefell v. Hodges Created a New
Methodology for Defining Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PL’Y 590 (2016).
51
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The second element of the Glucksberg standard required, “a careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.”54 The Obergefell majority acknowledged that, “while this
[careful description] approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there... it is
inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights,
including marriage.”55 The majority’s argument is, “the implication is that the ‘careful
description’ as posed by the Glucksberg majority might very well have been the undoing of
many previously held fundamental rights”56.
Kennedy was right to overrule the Glucksberg standards for substantive due process.
Those standards were too narrow. To allow fundamental rights to be defined only by history and
tradition would be to the detriment of minority groups in America who receive little protection
from majority votes that discriminate against them. One of the purposes of the Court is to protect
minority groups from a majority that would seek to discriminate against them. Justice Stone in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. emphasized this point. He said that when cases came to
the Court to determine the validity of “statutes directed at particular religious… or national… or
racial minorities”57 and those cases, “call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”58 It is the Court’s duty to inquire on whether the government may or may not
discriminate against minorities. The Glucksberg standards dismantled that protection by only
allowing rights to be fundamental if they were in accordance with the history and tradition of the
nation.

54

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 721 (1997).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2602 (2015).
56
Dave Rodkey, Article: Making Sense of Obergefell: A Suggested Uniform Substantive Due Process Standard, 79
U. PITT. L. REV. 769, (Summer, 2018).
57
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 (1938).
58
Id.
55
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Overruling the Glucksberg method for defining fundamental rights was a triumph of the
Obergefell opinion. However, this triumph led to one of Obergefell’s greatest mistakes. After
overruling the prior standard for defining fundamental rights, Kennedy created a new standard
which is overly broad, confusing, and left too much to individual judicial interpretation.

12

Mistakes Made in Obergefell
Justice Kennedy’s overruling of the Glucksberg method for defining and identifying
fundamental rights is a victory for the case and the plaintiffs, but how Kennedy replaced the
Glucksberg method is problematic. An examination of Kennedy’s new standard for determining
whether a right should be determined in its most general or most specific form says, “Judges
must closely examine the intrinsic principles of this general right and then make a determination:
are the central meanings of the broad right – the primary reasons why our society respects it –
clearly incompatible with the other more specific, less general rights”59. A simpler way of stating
this is, “Judges must inquire into whether the new application of the right considered in the
present suit is consistent with the core values of the more general, traditional version of the
right”60. Justice Kennedy’s new test creates, “a balancing test between the individual’s liberty
interest and the governmental interest”61.
While the previous Glucksberg test was inconsistent with prior precedent, this new test
from Kennedy does remedy that inconsistency. However, it only further complicates the process
by which the Court defines fundamental rights. The Glucksberg test determined that the Court
needed to use the narrowest definition of a right before examining it and determining whether it
is fundamental. This new test requires that judges must examine the asserted right in the case
and determine whether the intrinsic value of that right is consistent with the more general right
and whether that is consistent with the country’s legal values.

59

Thomas A. Bird, Note: Challenging the Levels of Generality Problem: How Obergefell v. Hodges Created a New
Methodology for Defining Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PL’Y 581 (2016).
60
Id.
61
Dave Rodkey, Article: Making Sense of Obergefell: A Suggested Uniform Substantive Due Process Standard, 79
U. PITT. L. REV. 778, (Summer, 2018).
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Not only is this new test overly complicated, but it leaves much to judicial interpretation.
The judge may determine how to describe the more general definition of a right, compare it to
the right at issue, and determine whether that stated right is consistent with the nation’s values.
These standards create opportunities for inconsistencies between the federal circuit courts. The
Supreme Court would then need to resolve these inconsistencies, which the Court created in the
first place. The Court has created a convoluted standard for future judges and more work for
itself in the future when inconsistencies occur. A pragmatic reason behind this new standard
could be the desire to be rid of the Glucksberg standard and to give appellate judges more power
regarding substantive due process cases. However, this still created the issue of inconsistencies
between circuit courts.
Since Obergefell was decided, there are no Supreme Court cases citing Obergefell
regarding substantive due process. These cases seem to avoid Obergefell and its new standard
altogether, likely because it is simply too complicated and gives little in the way of guidance to
courts deciding future substantive due process issues.
Despite the Court’s use of substantive due process in deciding Obergefell, substantive
due process was not necessary to reach the conclusion that same sex couples should have the
right to marry. Obergefell should have been decided on the basis of equal protection alone.
Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Obergefell, notes how the majority opinion does
not acknowledge any prior cases or doctrinal background of substantive due process.62 During
oral argument, he made the point that, “I’m not sure it’s necessary to get into sexual orientation
to resolve the case. I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him, and Tom

62

Id at 2618.
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can’t. And the difference is based on their different sex. Why isn’t that a straightforward
question of sexual discrimination?”63 Chief Justice Roberts simplifies the argument. A woman
could marry a man, but a man could not marry a man. This is clearly grounds for a case based
solely on sexual discrimination. The Chief Justice used this argument because if Obergefell v.
Hodges was decided on the basis of equal protection alone the Glucksberg standards would not
have been overruled.
Loving v. Virginia’s majority opinion provides precedent for basing Obergefell on equal
protection. The Court in Loving ruled that laws prohibiting interracial marriages violated the
Constitution based on the Equal Protection Clause.64 “The Court in Loving explained that a law
discriminates by race when it denies an otherwise lawful marriage based on the race of the
participants.”65 This discrimination can be applied in Obergefell’s situation because, “by the
same reasoning, reserving marriage to one man and one woman necessarily discriminates based
on the sex of the participants.”66 If the law cannot discriminate based on the race of the
participants to a marriage, then by similar reasoning the law should not be able to discriminate
based on the sex of participants to a marriage.
Denying marriage to same sex couples discriminated based on the sex of those who could
be married would not meet the test of intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny requires that
the policy being proposed by the government further an important government interest. The
means by which the government does this much be substantially related to that interest in order

63

Chief Justice Roberts, Transcription of Oral argument, at 61-61, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
64
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967).
65
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Article: Calling Out Heterosexual Supremacy: If Obergefell Had Been More Like Loving and
Less Like Brown, 25 VA. J. SOC. PL’Y & L. 297 (2018).
66
Id.
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for the government policy to overcome intermediate scrutiny. There is no important government
interest that is served by denying same sex couples the right to marry. In Craig v. Boren, the
Court proposed the test of intermediate scrutiny on the basis of sex discrimination. In order for
the government to pass a law that discriminates on the basis of sex the discrimination must,
“serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.”67 There is no governmental objective that would be served by not allowing
same sex couples to be married, nor would this discrimination be related to any relevant
governmental objective.
The respondents in Obergefell proposed reasons of their own as to why same sex
marriage should not be permitted. Respondents argued, “allowing same-sex couples to wed will
harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages.”68 If this argument
were seriously considered under the intermediate scrutiny test, the government’s objective would
be to protect the institution of marriage. Discriminating on the basis of sex by not allowing same
sex couples to be married would not meet the standard of substantially serving a government
interest in this instance because, “it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would
choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”69 Thus, marriage as an
institution is not harmed by allowing same sex couples to marry, and they would have correctly
and more easily been able to conclude that discriminating on the basis of sex and not allowing
same sex couples to be married is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.

67

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 197 (1976).
Obergefell v. Hodges, S. Ct. 2606 (2015).
69
Id at 2607.
68
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Had the Court used equal protection rather than a combination of equal protection with
substantive due process, the Court would not have doomed future cases of substantive due
process with a standard so open to judicial interpretation that it might create problems.
Although the Court does make mistakes in the Obergefell majority opinion, these are
clearly not the mistakes defined by the dissenters of Obergefell. The dissenters argue different
reasons as to why Obergefell’s majority is incorrect, and the end result that bans on same sex
marriages are unconstitutional. The dissenters’ arguments are faulty and, in the case of Justice
Thomas, unnecessary. They do not adequately reflect the mistakes of Obergefell and make
plenty of mistakes on their own.

17

Mistakes Made by the Dissenters
The dissenters to Obergefell did not correctly describe the mistakes of Obergefell. Justice
Thomas, Justice Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts each wrote a dissenting opinion and each has
at least one flaw that weakens their argument. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia argue the
decision regarding same sex marriage should have been decided by the people. Justice Thomas’s
argument relies on logic that is not congruent with prior Supreme Court precedent.
Thomas argues against the use of substantive due process not only in Obergefell but
argues that the Court should not use substantive due process to define and protect fundamental
rights at all. Thomas said, “by straying from the text of the Constitution, substantive due process
exalts judges at the expense of the people from whom they derive their authority.”70 Thomas
argues that liberty is defined narrowly saying, “as used in the Due Process clauses, ‘liberty’ most
likely refers to ‘the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to
whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint unless by
due course of law.”71 Kennedy, in the majority opinion, seems to counter this argument saying,
“the generations that wrote and ratified the… Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know
the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we would learn its meaning.”72 The Framers
did not claim to know, through the Constitution nor through the Bill of Rights, all that liberty
would encompass. This is exactly why they left powers not enumerated within the Constitution
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or the Bill of rights to the people.73 Thomas’ overly narrow definition of liberty deprives people
the right to challenge and change the definition of liberty through the court system.
Thomas believed the doctrine of substantive due process to be indefensible74. His opinion
is not supported by Supreme Court precedent. Justice Thomas disregards the concept of stare
decisis in his dissenting opinion regarding substantive due process’s place in the law. The
Supreme Court has long been using Substantive Due Process as a tool of justice and, “it has long
been established that the liberty aspect of Due Process encompasses implied rights, including the
right to privacy and the right to marry… This concept is also found in the Tenth Amendment,
which states that the list of rights enumerated in the Constitution is not exhaustive.”75 If the
concept of Substantive Due Process is, as Justice Thomas says, indefensible, removing it would
be detrimental to fundamental rights protected by the Supreme Court using Substantive Due
Process.
Justice Thomas makes an argument fatal to his opinion saying that the petitioners cannot,
“claim that the States have restricted their ability to go about their daily lives as they would be
able to absent governmental restrictions,”76 and he says, “petitioners have been left free to
engage in… enjoying the society of one’s spouse – without governmental interference.”77 Justice
Thomas is woefully incorrect here. He claims that the petitioners, who are same sex couples,
have been free to go about their daily lives as a couple without interference from the
government. This is clearly false. If petitioners were truly able to go about their daily lives, then
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the petitioners would be able to get married without interference from the government. Though
this was true in many states at the time, to say there was no governmental interference is
blatantly false.
This argument brings up the difference between positive and negative rights. A
negative right is a concept under which the government denies a person their rights. A positive
right is when the government gives something to the people, such as the governmental benefits
of marriage. The argument can be made here that the governmental benefits of marriage are a
positive right and therefore the government is not interfering with the couples’ right to marry.
This is false. While it is true the benefits provided by the government when two people marry is
a positive right, the government chose to interfere in the lives of same sex couples by
discriminating against them and denying the couples those benefits. The government provides a
service to those who are married, but when the government chose to discriminate against same
sex couples they interfered with their liberty.
Not only did state governments deny couples the right to marry,78 but the federal
government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between one man
and one woman79 and denied marriage benefits to same sex couples. Same sex couples were not
allowed to operate without governmental interference, as Justice Thomas claimed, but were also
forbidden from going about their daily lives due to governmental restrictions. This, along with
Thomas’ narrow definition of liberty, are weak arguments against the majority’s conclusion that
same sex couples should be permitted to marry, and do not withstand careful scrutiny.
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Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell is as hypocritical as it is incorrect. Justice Scalia echoes a
similar sentiment in his opinion in Romer v. Evans. Justice Scalia believes the people should
made the decision on whether same sex marriage is allowed because they are not biased with
animus, but with tradition. The Supreme Court in Romer held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado
state constitution, “classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else… Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause.”80 The
Supreme Court struck down the Amendment on the basis that Amendment 2 negatively
classified homosexuals when it was legislatively unnecessary.
Justice Scalia argued in Romer that, “the Court had erroneously assumed that Coloradans
who voted to strip away antidiscrimination protection for gays and lesbians through Amendment
2 were motivated by hatred rather than ‘traditional sexual mores’.”81 The crux of Scalia’s
argument here is that the legislature did not rely on hatred or animus when making the
classification, but instead was protected the ‘traditional sexual mores’ of the people of Colorado.
This does not constitute a legal argument that would support amendment 2 and, “Scalia was
wrong in concluding that such mores are a constitutionally legitimate reason to discriminate
against gays and lesbians.”82
In Obergefell, Justice Scalia also criticizes an idea that many have criticized the Supreme
Court for since its inception. This idea resolves around the concept that, at a minimum, five
unelected Supreme Court Justices can make decisions more millions of Americans83. Justice
Scalia uses this idea to criticize the majority opinion in Obergefell for striking down bans on
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same-sex marriage, similar to the way he criticized the majority opinion in Romer for striking
down Amendment 2.
This argument tends to gain traction when a Supreme Court decision is made that one
political party or another does not agree with, or when a Supreme Court Justice disagrees with
the majority opinion. This argument may have support, but the opposite argument has an
excellent rebuttal. “Although some do criticize [the power of 5 unelected judges to veto
democratically passed laws] and question its Constitutional foundation, the Court nonetheless
exercises the power on a regular basis and it is difficult to understand how any Justice who
regularly exercises this power can criticize it.”84 Justice Scalia did not criticize this power in the
majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, in which he created a new set of standards for
Substantive Due Process that had, theretofore, never been used standards that Obergefell
overruled and changed. In fact, not only did Scalia not criticize the power of the small majority
when writing his Glucksberg opinion, he never mentioned the issue at all. Though Scalia created
these standards in a case in which there was not a fundamental right,85 the new standards he
created affected substantive due process for the next several decades. He, an unelected judge,
made the decision on how to define fundamental rights under substantive due process without the
opinion of the people. He criticizes this power yet he readily uses this power when it serves his
interests.
Scalia furthers this argument by discussing how the public was already debating the
question of whether same sex marriage should be legal and that, “[I]ndividuals on both sides of
the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their
84
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views.”86 Scalia calls this debate respectful, but the reality for same sex couples was anything
but. According to FBI, members of the LGBT community increasingly became a higher target
for hate crimes over the ten years before Obergefell was decided.87 Members of the LGBT
community experienced the highest number of hate crimes per one million adults in 2014, just
one year before Obergefell was decided. (See Table 1)88.

(Table 1).

Proponents of same sex marriage gained significant attention between the years of 2005
and 2014. In 2004 Massachusetts was the first state to recognize same sex marriage89 followed
by many other states. In 2013, in United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down the Defense
Against Marriage Act’s definition of marriage as between one man and one woman.90 These
advances for same sex marriage gained positive as well as negative public attention. To try and
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argue that this decision should be left to the people’s respectful debate, when some of those
people are committing crimes against LGBT people at an increased rate, and the Court is the
proper place for the question of the legality of same sex marriage is a foolish argument.
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent is perhaps the most well-known and quoted of Obergefell’s
dissents. Despite being well known and often used as argument against Obergefell’s decision,
this dissent relies on faulty argument.
Roberts argues that, “distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is
rationally related to the States’ ‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving the traditional institution
of marriage.”91 This argument is incorrect because, “tradition in and of itself is not a legitimate
government interest.”92 This does not hold up to legal scrutiny. Tradition has never been
considered a legitimate government interest. Even in Washington v. Glucksberg which, until
Obergefell, set standards on how to determine whether a right was fundamental, did not describe
tradition as a legitimate government interest. In and of itself alone Tradition was used as a
guideline for determining whether a right was fundamental,93 not the sole basis for the
government to discriminate against a class of citizens.
Roberts also expresses concern about how Obergefell coincides with the First
Amendment regarding the practice of religion.94 However, it must be noted that, “The First
Amendment says, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof’… Congress played no role in Obergefell… the Obergefell
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decision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.”95 The majority opinion in Obergefell
even takes the time to address these concerns, arguing that religious exercise is not being
infringed upon by its decision.96 Roberts’ argument, while primarily being incorrect, had also
been addressed in the majority opinion and was unnecessary to address at all in his own
dissenting opinion.
Roberts addresses a similar argument to Scalia. He argues that the Court, “seizes for itself
a question the Constitution leaves to the people.”97 Both Scalia and Roberts argue that legally
allowing same sex marriages should be left to the states and to the people. However, the Court
granted certiorari to Obergefell to review two specific questions: “the first… is whether the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same
sex,”98 and, “the second… is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a
same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a state which does grant that right.”99 Roberts
suggests these questions should be left to the people, but these are questions the people cannot
answer because the people do not have the power to answer these questions.
Although the Tenth Amendment grants powers not enumerated to the federal government
to the states,100 the power to answer questions of constitutionality rest with the Supreme Court.
The Court gave itself this power in the case Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice
Marshall said, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is… those who apply the rule to particular cases, must out of necessity expound and

95

Megan M. Walls, Article: Obergefell v. Hodges: Right Idea, Wrong Analysis, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 144, (2016).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2607 (2015).
97
Id at 2612 (Roberts, dissenting).
98
Id at 2593.
99
Id.
100
U.S. Const. amend. X.
96

25

interpret the rule.”101 Marbury calls the constitution paramount law102 and that, “the judicial
power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.”103 The
questions argued by the petitioners in Obergefell concern the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Thus, these questions arise from the Constitution, and the Court has the power to
answer these questions. The state bans on same sex marriage represent laws in opposition to the
Constitution. Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, questions whether the constitution must, “yield to
the legislative act,”104 that contradicts the Constitution. The answer, Marshall finds, is that “a law
repugnant to the Constitution is void.”105 Marshall enumerated the Court’s ability to answer
questions regarding the laws of the United States, and also further explained that laws contrary to
the Constitution were void. The Supreme Court has had jurisdiction regarding questions of the
constitutionality of laws, and the power to strike down such laws for centuries since the
landmark of Marbury.
In Obergefell, state legislatures enacted laws banning same sex couples from being
married and refusing to recognize same sex marriages performed in states that did allow same
sex couples to marry106. When petitioners brought their questions of constitutionality to the
Court, the Court used its jurisdiction to answer these questions, declared the marriage bans as
being contrary to the Constitution,107 and deemed that states could not refuse to recognize lawful
same sex marriages performed in other states108. These questions could not have been answered
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by the people. Only the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to answer these questions and the
power to determine whether laws are constitutional.
The arguments proposed by the dissenters as to why Obergefell should not have struck
down the bans on same sex marriage do not provide sufficient reasoning. The dissenters’
arguments are flawed and mistaken. Justice Thomas argues that substantive due process should
not be used in the Court at all, and Scalia and Roberts argue that the people should answer
questions rather than the court despite these questions being within the Court’s jurisdiction to
answer. These arguments are weak, and because of these weak arguments the dissenters are in
the minority, on the wrong side of history regarding Obergefell.
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How Obergefell Should Have Gone Further
While Obergefell reached the correct conclusion in declaring that same sex couples are
included under the fundamental right to marry, the majority missed a distinct opportunity to
create a protected class for sexual orientation. As mentioned previously, Obergefell lists several
instances in which the nation had discriminated against same-sex couples in the past. The
medical community, such as the American Psychiatric Association, previously discriminated
against same-sex couples by considering their sexual orientation, homosexuality, a disease or
mental disorder109. Same sexual intimacy was a crime in many states110. Gays and lesbians were
prohibited from much government employment, barred from military service, targeted by police,
and burdened in their rights to associate.111 Even the Supreme Court had previously shown
prejudice against this class.
In Bowers v. Hardwick decided in 1986, the Supreme Court upheld laws that banned
homosexual sodomy. The respondent in that case, “asserted that there must be a rational basis for
the law,”112 and also said, “there was [no rational basis] in this case other than the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is moral and
unacceptable. This was said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law.”113 The majority
opinion responded to this by saying, “The law is constantly based on notion of morality… we are
unpersuaded that the sodomy laws… should be invalidated on this basis.”114
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Justice Kennedy, similar to his opinion in Obergefell overruling parts of Glucksberg,
overruled the decision of Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas saying, “Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today… it ought not to remain binding precedent… Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”115 Despite this obvious legal discrimination, the
Supreme Court opted not to further protect same-sex couples by declaring sexual orientation a
protect class. The Court, “neglected to bind future courts in stare decisis to the protection of
same-sex couples and LGBT minorities and bypassed the opportunity to deter future attempts to
deprive the community of fundamental rights… the Circuit Court split on whether sexual
orientation is a suspect class, and what level of judicial scrutiny the issue requires, remain
unresolved.”116
There are four criteria the Court has cited regarding determining whether a suspect
classification is present in a case. These criteria are important in determining whether the group
in question needs protection from the government in the form of suspect classification. The first
criteria is that, “the group has historically been discriminated against or have been subject to
prejudice, hostility, or stigma, perhaps due, at least in part, to stereotypes.”117 In Obergefell,
Kennedy said that the laws in question in the case, “burdened the liberty of same-sex couples,”118
and that, “especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to
same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm… the imposition of
this disability… serves to disrespect and subordinate [gays and lesbians].”119 This clearly
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describes a long history of discrimination in the United States. One of the criteria the Court has
previously used to designate a suspect class applies to sexual orientation, but not just one.
The next set of criteria describes a group having, “distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group,”120 and being, “a minority or politically powerless.”121 The
distinguishing characteristic of gays and lesbians is their sexual orientation. This is a
distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group. Furthermore, they are a
minority in the United States122 and have been politically powerless. The evidence that they are
politically powerless comes from the long history of legal discrimination against them Kennedy
referenced in Obergefell.
The final piece of criteria the Court has used when determining whether a group is
subject to suspect classification by the Supreme Court is that the characteristic that defines the
group, “bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society.”123 Sexual orientation
clearly does not inhibit people from contributing to society. There are at least seven billionaires
in the United States who are gay or lesbian.124 There are ten politicians in the current United
States Congress that are gay, lesbian, or bisexual.125 A person’s sexual orientation does not limit
people from contributing to society, and, thus, these criteria also apply to identifying sexual
orientation as a suspect class.
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Three criteria the Court has previously used to identify groups subject to suspect
classification by the Court also apply to sexual orientation; yet the Court in Obergefell refused to
grant suspect classification on the basis of sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy brought up the
long history of discrimination, legally and societally, against people of different sexual
orientation, particularly gays and lesbians. He brought up this information yet did not act on it in
a way that would protect sexual orientation from further legal discrimination. Obergefell did not
go far enough with this opinion. It did not create a quasi-suspect class for sexual orientation,
providing future protection for those who had been previously discriminated against by the law.
This must be rectified by the current Supreme Court due to Obergefell’s failure to act when it
had the opportunity.
Although Kennedy did not implement these protections in Obergefell, Kennedy likely
had reasons for not doing so. Obergefell was decided by a slim 5-4 majority in the Court.
Kennedy may not have been able to write the opinion as he would have wanted because he
needed to comply with the other four justices in the majority. If one justice disagreed with the
opinion and left, Kennedy would have lost the majority. It is understandable why Kennedy may
not have been able to enact these protections, but nevertheless, the opinion would be better off
having these protections.
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Conclusion
The Court was correct in granting same sex couples the right to marry in Obergefell and
to overrule the prior standard of substantive due process from Glucksberg. However, the Court
made a phenomenal mistake when, in overruling the Glucksberg standard, it failed to establish a
standard that would help courts when making decisions based on substantive due process.
Instead it created a system of interpretation that will cause more confusion in the future. The
Court should have announced standards for substantive due process that were broader than those
standards Scalia created in Glucksberg, but the standards set in place now by Obergefell are far
too broad. There are no concrete guidelines to guide judges in making decisions regarding
substantive due process. Justice Kennedy should have been clearer in the standards that he
wanted to set for substantive due process, rather than opening the door for individual judicial
interpretation and conflict.
The dissenters made mistakes when looking at Obergefell. Justice Roberts and Scalia
argued that the question of same sex marriage should be left to the people, not to the Supreme
Court, and were wrong in their analysis. Justice Thomas argued that substantive due process
should not be used at all, a dissonant argument when compared to the decades of precedent from
the Court using substantive due process. These arguments are weak when answering the question
of constitutionality regarding same sex marriage, and the majority was right to disagree with the
dissenters.
The Court should have protected sexual orientation as a suspect class, just as the Court
did for sex in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan126. Justice Kennedy referenced the
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legal and societal history of discrimination against same sex couples, but did not act upon it to
ensure that such discrimination would be less likely to reoccur. Instead ,the Court now must
address or consider future cases concerning employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation when that question could have and should have been answered in Obergefell.
Obergefell is a landmark decision regarding the rights of same sex couples, but many
cases seem to ignore its change to substantive due process127. This is likely due to the new
standard for substantive due process that Obergefell created is convoluted and undesirable to use.
It is unlikely any judge would want to use this standard to create precedent for substantive due
process cases. This needs to be addressed and changed by the Court soon to avoid further issues
and contradictions within substantive due process case law.
Obergefell is a case to be celebrated regarding the rights of same sex couples. After
centuries of discrimination, same sex couples were finally allowed the right to marry thanks to
this case. However, simply because a case is triumphant in one area does not make it perfect in
another. Obergefell’s new substantive due process standard leaves much to be desired, and the
lack of protection in the form of a suspect class for sexual orientation creates new problems for
the future. These issues will have to be clarified by the Court eventually, but for now Obergefell
remains a case to be both celebrated and read with reservation for the future.
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